A simple model with asymmetric information, in which inventory holders or traders submit demand curves to an auctioneer, has a unique partially revealing equilibrium. We wonder whether the agents can plausibly coordinate on this equilibrium through "eductive" reasoning relying on Common Knowledge. The analysis stresses the role of two e¤ects, "sensitivity" and "ampli…cation", whose product should be small enough. The property obtains whenever the equilibrium excess demand is steep enough, i.e. when the search for information does not distort demand too much. Neither the in ‡uence of the number of informed agents nor that of "noise trading" are monotonic. Real time learning has strikingly di¤erent features.
Introduction
Most of the theoretical analysis of the transmission of information through prices, adopt variants of the so-called "rational expectations equilibrium", that was popularized by the earlier literature (Grossman (1976) , Green (1977) , Radner (1979)) 1 . The present paper aims at revisiting the basic option of this literature : although we refer to a standard price revealing equilibrium concept, we do not take it as an ultimate modelling axiom. On the contrary, we associate with the equilibrium a "story"(as the tâtonnement process may be viewed as a "story"associated with the Walrasian equilibrium) that explains its "implementation".
Such a story, …rst, provides a well speci…ed "game-form" 2 that makes explicit the conditions of choice of the agents; second, and this is the key point, it associates with the equilibrium a mental process that leads the agents to "educe"the equilibrium. If, as we believe, the plausibility of the coordination embedded in the equilibrium concept is much higher when our "eductive"story does converge -the equilibrium is then said "Eductively" Stable or Strongly Rational -then the information transmission predicted from such an equilibrium is more …rmly established. On the contrary, a failure of the equilibrium to meet the additional conditions, which we focus on, signals theoretical fragility. In other words; in the models under consideration; our conclusions provide an assessment; based on clear premises; of the plausibility of rational expectations like coordination:
The paper considers simple partial equilibrium models with asymmetric information. We stick to a simple interpretation of the model as describing a simple linear-quadratic inventory markets, some variants of which relate with the "…-nance" model of Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) . Informed agents receive a signal (the same for all) about whether the state is good or bad and there are also uninformed agents as well as noise traders 3 . Traders submit demand schedules contingent on their information to a centralized auctioneer. In the basic inventory model it is shown that a unique partially revealing equilibrium exists (and with aggregate excess demand strictly decreasing in prices) when the distribution of noise trade is log-concave. We examine whether this equilibrium has strong "rationalizability" properties that makes it the outcome of an introspective "eductive" reasoning, or at a more basic level whether common knowledge of both rationality and the structure of model is su¢ cient to lead to the equilibrium.
We assess two basic conditions for "eductive stability"of the equilibrium : 1) the Bayesian beliefs of uninformed agents should not be too sensitive to quantities (sensitivity e¤ect) and/or 2) the response of non informed agents to the beliefs about the good state should not be too large (ampli…cation e¤ect).
The combination of these two e¤ects underlies several speci…c aspects of expectations coordination. A …rst point is that a high variance of the noise, because it makes the price system less informative, reduces the sensitivity e¤ect, and therefore favors coordination. A second feature is that, regarding the number of informed and non informed agents, coordination improves at the corners, i.e. when there are many informed agents since the ampli…cation e¤ect is small -intuitively, it is then easy for non informed to "follow the crowd" -or when there are few informed agentsthen there is not much to learn and to think about, and the sensitivity e¤ect is limited 4 .
Our results, although they are obtained from a signi…cantly di¤erent model, also meet the suspicion of Gennotte-Leland (1990) that a non monotonic demand of uninformed agents creates problems for coordination: indeed, here the slope of global excess demand, that depends more and more of the non informed excess demand when there are more and more informed agents, plays a key role in our "eductive" process. The equilibrium cannot be fully learned when the strategic learning mechanism is associated with a large ampli…cation e¤ect: this occurs when the information search relies a lot more on prices than would a naive, non-strategic behavior, hence particularly when uninformed excess demand is non monotonic.
The relationship of the just sketched analysis with existing literature deserves a few comments. First, one distinctive feature of the present paper is that it attempts at returning to some of the preoccupations of the early literature on information transmission through prices and at revisiting them from our alternative viewpoint. An important feature of our model is that the market structure is competitive: the market share of each informed agent is in…nitesimal 5 . More- 4 The release of information about a security listed on an organized market obeys to very strict rules: in most cases, trading is suspended to allow private information to be disseminated; when it is known by a su¢ ciently large proportion of agents, trading is resumed. In our setup, the knowledge that a small share of agents hold some private information is compatible with coordination; but as this share increases, coordination is more and more di¢ cult and may even become impossible; however, as this share becomes large enough, coordination may be possible. An interpretation of our model is that since coordination is more di¢ cult for intermediate values of the share of the informed, it may make sense to suspend trading when a new information is available to few agents, and to resume trading only when the information is known by many. 5 In contrast, the …nance literature (following Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 ) has generally given up the competitve framework of the early contributions and instead, considered informational monopolies (or oligopolies), and emphasized the role of risk-neutral market makers in a world with "noise"(or liquidity) traders. Following a di¤erent route, the general equilibrium literature has developed a number of generalizations to account, for example, of the di¤erence between the over, our model focuses on a static framework for which transmission has to be immediate. Second, the approach has to be compared with previous attempts at explaining the occurrence of an equilibrium, rather than assuming it: this is the objective of the literature that views the implementation of an equilibrium as the outcome of a (generally long) real time learning process (see in particular Vives (1993) ). Although we can describe our procedure as "learning", it clearly di¤ers from "evolutive learning" in motivation -we are interested in instantaneous and not in progressive (slow) learning -as well as in content -as documented in Section 5, indeed, the ‡avor of our conclusion is often quite opposite to that derived from the "evolutive" learning story, where for example, the informativeness of prices unambiguously increases the speed of learning.
It should be stressed that the paper has an exploratory dimension: in particular, attention is focused on a very simple inventory decision situation. Steps for developing the theory are suggested in the concluding section.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model and its equilibrium. Section 3 focuses on the existence of equilibrium. Section 4 studies the conditions of success of expectational coordination, as assessed from the "eductive"algorithm under scrutiny.
Section 5 discusses connections with related literature, and Section 6 sketches one line of extension of the present model.
A brief Conclusion is o¤ered.
The model: framework, equilibrium and questions
Our interest for the model that we are now going to describe follows the study of Guesnerie-Rochet (1993) that is devoted to the analysis of a partial equilibrium inventory problem. However the model also relates with (special cases of) Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) 's model, and we will stress a "…nance"extension of the model that will enter the more general formulation considered in Section 6.
The determinants of Excess Demand: the inventory story
The agents in our model may be viewed as inventory holders for some commodity (wheat). The price of the commodity next period is a random variable , and its price to-day when the inventory decision has to be made is dimension of the signals and the dimension of prices (see, among others, Jordan (1983) ).
p. There is a quadratic cost, (b( )=2)z 2 of holding inventories, that depends possibly on some cost characteristics of the agent, so that the expected pro…t of a risk neutral agent who holds z units (and does not discount the future) is:
and his demand is:
where E( ) is the expected value of the random variable .
If there is a large number of such small agents (all expecting the value E( )), assumed for simplicity to be a continuum of in…nitesimal agents, aggregate demand is:
Without loss of generality, we shall consider that the harmonic mean b of the b( ) is equal to 1. Now, we assume that the information only consists of one signal s 2 fG; Bg which provides the missing (true) information on E( ). In the following, we identify s with the expectation G or B, that it triggers. We also assume that def = G B > 0, so that G (good) is an optimistic signal and B (bad) is a pessimistic one.
Next we assume that the agents are divided into two groups:
-Informed agents receive all the same signal, that again may be G or B 6 : -Non informed agents receive no signal 7 .
The informed group size is % of the total size (one by convention).
6 Note that, although information privately held by an informed agent is not in…nitesimal (our agents are not informationally small in the sense of McLean-Postlewaite (1999) ), no agent has informational monopoly power. 7 As the reader will note later, we assume that the common prior distribution puts equal probability on each state.
We also suppose that there is no correlation between the fact that an agent receives a signal and his cost characteristics , so that the aggregate demand of informed agents and uninformed agents respectively are E I ( ) p and (1 ) E N I ( ; :) p , and aggregate excess demand Z is then:
where E I ( ) and E N I ( ; :) respectively designate the expected value of for informed and non informed agents. Note that E I ( ) depends on the signal received by the informed agent only, (then E I ( ) is here B or G) when E N I ( ; :) may depend on anything the uninformed agent thinks relevant, and naturally the price itself is a good candidate! Note that, as the mass of agents is one, one will be able to visualize on the same Figure 1 , as well individual and aggregate (excess) demand. Again, the informed agents have a linear demand curve, the slope is 1, (which is insigni…cant) and the intercept is the value of E I ( ) inferred from their private information, when the uninformed demand is a priori more complicated (an example of which is denoted Z N I (p) on Figure 1 ).
Figure 1
Finally, the supply of the good is a random variable ", whose mean is conventionally …xed at zero, and that can be interpreted as the supply of noisy traders 8 . We assume that " admits a C 2 probability density function . Equilibrium obtains whenever excess demand equals noisy supply, i.e. whenever Z = ".
We provide in the appendix a …nancial market story, à la Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) that leads to the same basic equations as the present inventory model.
Game Form and Equilibrium
Our analysis focuses on a speci…c market clearing process which is the following: there is one auctioneer who asks the agents to submit a demand curve; given all demand curves the auctioneer determines a market clearing price (or select one according to a …xed rule, if there are several) and allocates to each agent the quantity demanded at that price.
Note that, a priori, our procedure may generate multiplicity of equilibria or no equilibrium. To deal with the …rst di¢ culty, we assume that the auctioneer uses the following rule: when there are several equilibria, he always picks up the one with the smallest price.
9 To deal with the second one, we assume that in the absence of market clearing price, there will be no trade.
10 Finally, we require demand to be de…ned on all IR, allowing negative prices, and explain this modelling choice in the footnote.
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The just de…ned procedures provide a clear "game form"for the problem, or if one prefers a clearly de…ned procedure for the implementation of the information revealing equilibria, the so-called "rational expectations equilibria" of the early literature.
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Which demand curves will be transmitted to the auctioneer ? The answer is obvious for the informed agents (it will be B p or G p), and it is assumed that non informed agents are Bayesian and furthermore extract information from prices "rationally", in the standard sense associated with the concept of a "rational expectations"price revealing equilibrium. Indeed, a (rational expectations) partially revealing equilibrium is associated with strategies of the agents (here excess demand functions submitted to the auctioneer) that form a Nash-Bayesian equilibrium.
Before giving the formal de…nition, some notation is required. We de…ne, when possible, (z; ) = (z+ ) (z+ ) + (z) . This function plays a key role; its meaning is the following. Assume that total excess demand if B (bad state) for some given price is z; assume that the di¤erence between excess demand when the state of nature is G (good state) and when it is B is + ; equilibrium in such a situation obtains if noisy supply " equals excess demand, i.e. either if s = B and " = z or if s = G and " = z + ; then (z; ) is the conditional probability of G, that a Bayesian agent will associate to such a situation. In other words, (z; ) is the conditional probability of G, when excess demand if B is z, and excess demand if G is z + . De…nition 2.1. A partially revealing equilibrium consists of: equilibrium strategies (i), that de…ne an equilibrium for every state of nature (ii) and that are associated with consistent Bayesian beliefs (iii).
i) Equilibrium strategies: -Informed agents transmit s p, i.e.:
For every " and every signal s, there is an equilibrium price p("; s) de…ned as the smallest zero of:
and all demanded transactions at this price are implemented. iii) Equilibrium Bayesian beliefs:
), for all p that may be reached at equilibrium, in both states of nature (where = G B, and the function has just been de…ned).
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The de…nition is unsurprising, but requires some comments.
Agents take optimal decisions given beliefs. Beliefs are determined according to Bayes'law: the di¤erence between excess demand when G and excess demand when B being , the probability of G associated with the occurrence of p is nothing else than (Z(p; B);
The de…nition does require that at least one equilibrium occurs in every state of nature and for every realization of the noise. 13 If we consider the case where all prices cannot be reached, we should make the de…nition more precise as follows. We denote P def = fpj9s; "= (") > 0 and p = p("; s)g the support of equilibrium prices. The above formula holds for p 2 P . E N I ( jp) may take any value between B and G, if p = 2 P: (Beliefs are left free whenever they are not constrained by Bayes'law.) Finally, it should be noted that we can let the noise tend to zero and obtain, as shown in Section 5, a limit Fully Revealing Equilibrium.
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The concept may, now, be brie ‡y appraised from the view point of the mechanism design literature. Seen through these glasses, our game is not a very e¢ cient revelation device: indeed, in the present context, it is well known, at least from La¤ont (1985) , that designing a game form in which the Planner would elicit all the socially relevant information, even in dominant strategy, is not di¢ cult. Here, our auctioneer is however subject to a constraint that has no counterpart in the incentives literature: it must use only the aggregate information, not the individual one, a fact that may be viewed as re ‡ecting the anonymity properties of a market like situation. Hence, our analysis may be considered as relating with market like implementation, and as we shall see later "dominant solvable market like implementation".
Existence of an equilibrium
The …rst question to be asked is under what conditions an equilibrium exists.
Existence result
The following proposition is our main existence result 15 .
Proposition 3.1. If , the density function of the noise is log-concave (i.e., log( ) is concave), then there exists a unique partially revealing equilibrium. Aggregate excess demand is strictly decreasing in prices.
14 The concept relates but does not coincide with the "fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium" that, as it was standard in the earlier literature, was associated with the following beliefs of non informed agents (see Radner (1979) for a …rst precise de…nition): p = G (resp. B) signals for sure G (resp. B). Given these beliefs, it is the case that excess demand is zero, if G at p = G and if B at p = B. Here, as well as in Section 5, we need to exhibit the equilibrium strategies, i.e. the equilibrium demand of everybody at every price and not only at p = G and p = B (and even not only in a neighborhood of the equilibrium). 15 In this section and in the next one, we restrict attention to the case where the support of the random variable " is IR. It is left to the reader to check that the statement is still valid for a distribution with compact support: she will then have to rely on the comprehensive version of point iii) of the de…nition given in footnote 13.
A few comments may be made. Firstly, some conditions are needed on the noise distribution for an equilibrium to exist; log-concavity is su¢ cient for existence (although not necessary, as Lemma 3.2 below makes clear). We shall come back later on the rationale for this condition, but we note here that a standard Gaussian distribution is log-concave. Secondly, even though the aggregate demand of the non informed is not necessarily monotonic, the equilibrium aggregate excess demand functions Z(:; B) and Z(:; G) are necessarily decreasing functions, as shown in the following Figure 2 16 . This monotonicity property makes clear that in our setup, contrarily to what happens in Gennotte-Leland (1990) , there cannot be, in a given state of nature and for some given realization of the noise, several spot equilibria (and hence the selection rule is never used at equilibrium). Thirdly, and this is di¤erent from the previous property, if the equilibrium exists, it is unique (in the sense that there only exists one equilibrium aggregate excess demand curve Z(:; s); s = B or G).
Figure 2
Note on Figure 2 the position of the equilibrium prices p (0; B) and p (0; G). Figure 2 presents a case in which the aggregate demand of the non informed agents is not monotonic: over some price range, the aggregate demand is almost ‡at, which may only be the case if the non-informed demand is locally increasing; on that range, the non informed beliefs vary rapidly, re ‡ecting a rapidly changing content of the transmitted information when prices vary. As we shall see later, this phenomenon has a striking in ‡uence on coordination. However, the total aggregate excess demand must be monotonically decreasing for an equilibrium to exist.
Existence: an intuitive proof of a Preparation Lemma
Let us now try to give some intuitive understanding of the existence problem. This intuition will lead us to a proof of a "Preparation Lemma" from which the existence result will be immediately derived. Take some z 0 and some a priori given p 0 . Can it be the case that z 0 is the aggregate excess demand, associated to the bad state B when the price is p 0 ? 16 The asymptotes of Z (:; B) (resp. Z (:; G)) are the lines of equation z = B p and z = B + (1 ) p (resp. z = G (1 ) p and z = G p). The vertical distance between the two graphs is .
A …rst remark is in order: the answer can be positive only if B p 0 z 0 G p 0 (since all individual strategies fall in this interval). Second remark: the considered couple (z 0 ; p 0 ) is necessarily such that z 0 + is the excess demand, associated to the good state G when the price is p 0 . As argued above, this implies that the conditional probability of the good state for the non informed agents is (z 0 ; ) and their demand is (1 ) [B p 0 + (z 0 ; ) ] : The answer to our initial question is easy: if z 0 is the excess demand, associated to the bad state B when the price is p 0 , then, necessarily 17 :
Now let us consider the following Figure 3 .
Figure 3
In the diagram, z is along the horizontal axis, and the probability P of G as evaluated by the non informed agents is on the vertical axis. Take the vertical window [B p 0 ; B + (1 ) p 0 ] and …x some z 0 in between. On our …gure, the graph of the function P (z) = (z;
) is visualized: an equilibrium is at the intersection of this graph and of the straight line going from fB p 0 ; 0g to fB p 0 + (1 ) ; 1g; with equation: z = B p 0 + (1 ) P . This leads to the following conclusions: le fait d'avoir deux notations P et ne paraît guère justi…é ... i) If for any z, the slope 0 z of the probability function P (z) is smaller than the slope of the straight line 1=(1 ) , then the intersection is unique and the corresponding demand Z(p 0 ; B) is nothing else than z 0 as de…ned in Equation (3.1): the graph of Z is such that z is a function of p: Besides, Equation (3.1) can be written p 0 = (z 0 ), where (z)
18 In other words, the graph of Z is such that p is a decreasing function of z. The two remarks together imply that Z(p; B) is a monotonic and decreasing function of p.
ii) If for some z, (1 ) 0 z > 1, then the construction of Figure 3 may involve three (or more) points of intersection: the graph of Z is still the graph of a function p = (z), but it is no longer such that z is a function of p. Then, it cannot be interpreted as an equilibrium con…guration in the sense of the above de…nition: strategies are de…ned as functions of p, so that excess demand has the same properties. The reader will convince himself that there is no reasonable change in the de…nition of equilibrium that is compatible with the fact that excess demand is required to have, at least, one zero and that allows to consider the found con…guration as an equilibrium con…guration.
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The teachings of our investigation can be summarized in the following Lemma.
). The four following propositions are equivalent:
0 (z) 0 and strict inequality holds except for a set of zero measure.
and strict inequality holds except for a set of zero measure.
3. There exists a partially revealing equilibrium.
4. There exists a unique partially revealing equilibrium. Aggregate excess demand is C 1 and strictly decreases from +1 to 1.
Indeed, this lemma gives us necessary and su¢ cient conditions for existence. The log-concavity assumption provides us a condition su¢ cient for the lemma to hold. Hence the above existence theorem.
In fact, log concavity assures the validity of a Monotonic Likelihood Ratio Condition (MLRC), which triggers condition 2 of the Lemma . Let us remind that a distribution satis…es the (MLRC) condition if for any , '(z; )
is strictly decreasing in z:
20 As = 1=(1+1='), (MLRC) implies that is decreasing 19 Anderson-Sonnenschein (1982) however propose to extend the de…nition of equilibria. We might change our de…nition of equilibrium and say here, in line with our comprehensive assesment of the game form, that when there is no equilibrium, there is no trade : a discontinuous, but upper hemi-continuous selection of the inverse of p(z) would de…ne an equilibrium. Naturally, such an "equilibrium" raises major coordination problems and has no chance to be eductively stable. This is the reason why we choose not to view it formally as an equilibrium. 20 The interpretation is simple. Remember that noisy supply " equals excess demand either if s = B and " = z, or if s = G and " = z + ; therefore, '(z; ) is the likelihood ratio of G versus B: the assumption that it decreases with z indicates that a higher z signals a lower relative likelihood of G. Also notice that this condition holds for a number of standard distributions (for example, normal distributions). In some examples, Green (1977) already made clear that the failure of such a Monotonicity condition creates existence problems. In our setting, however, the condition is su¢ cient but not necessary.
in z, i.e on the diagram, that the graph of P (z) is decreasing. So point 2 of the lemma is trivially satis…ed. .
Lastly, concerning the relationship between (MLRC) and log concavity, notice that ' 0 z has the sign of
. Therefore (MLRC) holds for any = if and only if d dz log (z) is decreasing in z. This is equivalent to the fact that is log-concave.
We have then proved, with uniqueness, a rather strong existence theorem. Eductive stability is however another matter.
Eductive stability 4.1. Preliminaries: concept and basic argument
In this section, we focus attention on an "eductive" construction of the revealing equilibrium of the previous section. We describe a mental learning process, based on guessing and second guessing, through which the agents may "educe" the equilibrium. The learning process under scrutiny is individual and takes place in virtual time. When successful, it leads every agent to predict the others' behavior and to convince himself to play his equilibrium strategy: in that case, we say that the equilibrium is "Dominant-Solvable", "Strongly Rational"or ("Eductively") Stable. The present analysis aims at determining the factors that favor such stability.
At some basic level, the just evoked mental process relies on Common Knowledge (from now on CK) assumptions: we are going to sketch the related principles, while remaining rather informal 21 in terms of the pure game theoretical standards. We assume CK of individual rationality and CK of the model. The assumption of rationality means that every agent submits a demand function that is optimal at every price, given beliefs. CK of the model means CK of the structure of preferences, market clearing rule and every detail presented above.
The mental process in which the agents are supposed to be engaged leads them in good cases to "guess"the equilibrium. It is based on a point by point inspection of excess demand, the principle of which is rather simple. One now presents this process in the speci…c case where (MLRC) holds true.
Assume that an uninformed agent happens to know for some reason that total excess demand at some price p is z e if B; then he knows that the probability of the good state G, if he observes this p is (z e ; ). He also knows that, in the same con…guration, if z is smaller than z e , then the probability of the good state is higher than (z e ; ): this is a consequence of (MLRC) (a higher z, everything equal, signals a lower probability of the good state). 22 Now, if everybody knows that z z e , then the uninformed demand will be greater than (1 ) [B p + (z e ; )], and then total excess demand if B will be greater than B p + (1 ) (z e ; ). Furthermore, if not only everybody knows that z z e , but also that everybody knows that everybody knows it, then everybody knows that total excess demand if B will be greater than B p + (1 ) (z e ; ). This is the key argument. We only show now how it can be initiated and pursued into a complete "eductive"process : Figure 4 , similar to Figure 3 will provide an intuitive understanding of the issue.
The argument takes place at some given p 0 . Let us repeat the comments on the main features of the next diagram : on the horizontal axis, z is between B p 0 and B p 0 + (1 ) ; on the vertical axis is the probability P of the good state; the graph of (:; ) has from (MLRC), the shape indicated; the straight line visualizes the graph of the inverse function of z = B p 0 + (1 ) P , i.e. in the axes (z; P ), total excess demand as a function of uninformed beliefs P .
Figure 4
Existence was based on the fact that the two curves under scrutiny had an intersection. As the reader may already guess, "Eductive"Stability will here depend crucially on the relative slopes of the two curves that have been stressed.
Let us be more formal and introduce p 0 (z)
). The eductive argument comes as follows:
-Initially, it is CK that z z 0 = B p 0 + (1 ) , where z 0 is the maximal demand (that obtains when P = 1, i.e. uninformed agents are fully optimistic).
-Then, it is CK that the probability that Bayesian non informed agents give to the good state is P (z 0 ; ) = P 0 (because of MLRC). -Then, it is CK that total excess demand z B p 0 +(1
-Then, it is CK that the probability that Bayesian non informed agents give to the good state is P (z 1 ; ) = P 1 :
22 If the agent knows that z z e , the argument (obviously) follow the same lines. The argument holds as well when the uninformed agent has an uncertain expectation of aggregate excess demand, represented by a distribution of z smaller than z e .
-Then, it is CK that total excess demand z B p 0 +(1
etc... The argument is visualized by the cobweb-like process sketched in Figure 4 . The …gure illustrates the case where the absolute value j 0 z j of the slope of the likelihood function is smaller than the slope of the straight line 1= (1 ) . On the …gure, it is clear that the "eductive"argument converges towards the equilibrium point: the condition j 0 z j < 1=(1 ) is su¢ cient to trigger convergence (one may notice that the condition rewrites 0 p < 1, i.e. p is globally contracting). If the inequality j 0 z j < 1=(1 ) does not hold true somewhere, then, from the inspection of Figure 4 , there will be a (set of) price(s) where the "eductive" process will not converge (choose p 0 such that the inequality does not hold for some z between B p 0 and B p 0 + (1 ) ). Then we have proved the following lemma 23 .
Lemma 4.1. The unique partially revealing equilibrium is strongly rational if and only if j 0 z j 1= (1 ) and strict inequality holds except for a set of zero measure.
Let us comment it now.
A small value of j 0 z j means that the Bayesian beliefs of uninformed agents are somewhat insensitive to quantities, a fact that should help coordination: guessing the others' beliefs is easier when they are not too responsive to what the other guess. We call this e¤ect the sensitivity e¤ect. It is small or moderate, (resp. large and signi…cant) when the graph of is almost horizontal (resp. almost vertical).
On the other hand, (1 ) measures the size of the response of non informed agents to the beliefs concerning the occurrence of the good event G: it increases with the number of uninformed agents and with the "impact on individual demand" of information, as measured by . It makes intuitive sense that an increase of such a size index deteriorates the conditions of coordination: guessing the responses of others to informational changes is easier when these responses are not too large. We call the corresponding e¤ect, an ampli…cation e¤ect. It is small (resp. large), when many (resp. few) agents are informed and/or the informational gap is small (resp. large).
The lemma can be then restated in a more intuitive and evocative way: Stability obtains if the product of the sensitivity e¤ect and of the ampli…cation e¤ect is smaller than one.
Note here that, for any z in IR (the proofs are in the appendix):
It follows that if
or if:
(1 ) sup
then the conditions of the lemma are satis…ed and stability obtains. In a given setting, the conditions of these statements may be checked from the basic data of the problem. However, the answer to our initial query is still incomplete: the next subsection stresses other aspects and/or draws more explicit lessons.
Main results and further intuition
The next result directly follows from the application of our preliminary results to the normal distribution: it provides a much more explicit necessary and su¢ cient condition for eductive stability:
Proposition 4.2. Assume that " follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2 . The unique partially revealing equilibrium is strongly rational if and only if:
(1 )
Proof.
where X is exp 2 2 (2z + ). One checks that X=(1 + X) 2 varies between 0 and 1=4 when X varies in IR + . The Proposition derives from Lemma 4.1.
Proposition 4.2 allows us to enter into some interesting comparative statics.
For given ; ; an increase in , i.e. an increase in the exogenous noise that decreases the informational content of prices, favors stability.
For given ; , an increase in , that, in some sense, measures the in ‡uence on individual demand of the information held by the informed agents, is detrimental to stability. The intuition somewhat relates to the previous one: not too much information should be transmitted.
Considering = , when is …xed, one sees that an increase of = is favorable: indeed, the formula shows that =4 is su¢ cient for stability, whatever : For given ; ; the proportion of informed agents , has an ambiguous e¤ect: many informed agents as well as few favor stability, when an intermediate number is less favorable. This ambiguous role played by results from the existence of two opposite e¤ects of , that exactly correspond to the two e¤ects exhibited in the preceding subsection. On the one hand, a large has a positive e¤ect on stability, because it reduces the ampli…cation e¤ect (bounded by (1 ) ), which makes smaller the in ‡uence on aggregate demand of the beliefs of non informed agents. On the other hand, a small has a positive e¤ect on stability as well, because it reduces the sensitivity e¤ect (bounded by =4 2 , as shown in the proof of Proposition 4.2), which makes the beliefs of non informed agents not too sensitive to their expectations of aggregate demand.
The next proposition takes a more synthetical viewpoint: it relates the plausibility of eductive stability with equilibrium behavior. Indeed, the variations of aggregate demand at equilibrium can be separated into a …rst term due to the variation of the price and a second term due to the change in expectations. When the price increases, the …rst term causes a decrease of aggregate demand, while the second term causes an increase of aggregate demand through its positive e¤ect on the beliefs of non informed agents. The small sensitivity to expectations required for eductive stability also requires that this belief e¤ect cannot overcome the price e¤ect.
Proposition 4.3. Assume existence of an equilibrium with aggregate excess demand Z.
It is stable if and only if the aggregate excess demand Z(p; B) (or Z(p; G))
satis…es for every price p: dZ dp (B; p) 1 2 ;
and strict inequality holds except for a set of zero Lebesgue measure.
2. If there are few informed agents ( < 1=2), a necessary condition for eductive stability of an equilibrium is that the demand of non informed agents be a decreasing function of the price.
Proof. We know from the preceding section that the equilibrium aggregate demand Z(p; B) is de…ned pointwise as a …xed point of the map p , and is C 1 . Di¤erentiating the …xed point condition gives: dZ dp = @ p @p + @ p @z dZ dp ; dZ dp = 1
with @ p =@p = 1. As Z can take every value in IR, Lemma 4.1 proves point 1 of the proposition. Let Z I and Z N I the demand of an informed and a non informed respectively and write: dZ dp = dZ I dp + dZ N I dp = + (1 ) dZ N I dp :
Point 2 follows then from point 1.
Proposition 4.3 is a striking statement: it says that expectations coordination, as we appraise it here, requires a steep enough aggregate demand. Strangely enough, it meets the suspicion of Gennotte-Leland (1990) , that a non monotonic behavior of some agents who attempt to extract information from prices is detrimental to coordination. Indeed, when there are not too many informed agents, Gennotte-Leland. Note that, although our theory does not claim to explain what is going on when stability is not insured, it suggests the occurrence of uncoordinated actions, that might be associated with crashes or crisis, when the slope of aggregate demand is insu¢ ciently steep rather than upward sloping.
Connections with related literature
This section has two subsections. The …rst one relates our results with the preliminary results of that considered the non noisy version of this model. The second one evokes the connections with the literature on evolutive learning à la Vives (1993) .
The case of "small" noise (continuity with the non noisy case)
Desgranges-Guesnerie (2000) have obtained stability results in the non noisy version of the present model. But a super…cial look at the preceding stability results suggests that stability cannot obtain with a "small"noisy supply (for instance, a Gaussian noisy supply with a small variance 2 , see Proposition 4.2). Still, this remark, that reveals some form of discontinuity at the limit, may be misleading as there is no entirely compelling de…nition of a small noise. Indeed, we now show that stability obtains for a speci…c kind of "small" noise (and, therefore, continuity at the non noisy limit obtains as well for this kind of noise).
Let us consider a random supply " with support in [ ; ]. When = 0, the random supply reduces to a Dirac measure and the economy is (obviously) called non noisy. When is small enough, the properties of equilibrium are similar to those of the non noisy case (as studied in and very di¤erent from the ones obtained in the Gaussian case:
Proposition 5.1. Assume < =2. Then, there exists an equilibrium and every equilibrium is fully revealing. Equilibrium prices are, for every " in [ ; ]:
Furthermore, the fully revealing excess demand is always educed. The mental process of the non informed agents converges "quickly" after two (resp. three) "steps"of the "eductive"argument, when the proportion of informed agents is strictly greater (resp. less) than = + 1=2.
The detailed proof is in appendix. When tends to 0, the equilibrium price distribution tends to the one of the non noisy case, namely the price in state B (resp. G) is equal to B (resp. G).
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The argument proving stability is identical to the one considered in DesgrangesGuesnerie (2000) : it entirely relies on the random supply's support being bounded. It is best understood in the case with many informed agents, namely when > = + 1=2. De…ne the two sets of prices appearing with positive probability in each state s = B; G when every agent is rational (i.e. after the …rst step of eduction) (sets I B and I G on Figure 5 ). The condition > = + 1=2 implies that these two sets do not intersect. Hence, at the second step, a price in each of these two sets reveals the underlying state s with probability 1 to every non informed agent: equilibrium prices are educed.
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Figure 5 Lastly, we discuss how to investigate a more general case where the support of the "small" noise remains IR. The underlying issue is the possible occurrence of a discontinuity between the limit noisy results and the non noisy case. We want to argue that, in general, a probabilistic view of stability (that is weaker than the stability considered up to now) may be more appropriate for the small noise problem. Indeed, a careful reading of the preceding section shows that, for a Gaussian noise with small variance 2 , the equilibrium is unstable, but instability occurs at some prices only. Each of these prices is associated with a set of "rationalizable" aggregate excess demand. At the remaining prices, the equilibrium demand is correctly educed by non informed agents. Then, when the variance 2 tends to zero, the question is to know whether enough prices are stable and whether the probability that an out of equilibrium price-quantity appears tends to zero. In fact, the answer to this question is that, when the variance 2 tends to zero, an out of equilibrium price-quantity couple may not be ruled out with high probability by the "eductive"process, a fact documenting some form of limit discontinuity. Precisely, it can be checked that this "probabilistic instability" 25 Furthermore, like in the non noisy case, and as allowed by Point iii) of the de…nition (see footnote 13), equilibrium demand is not constrained at non equilibrium prices. Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium price distribution although there are in…nitely many equilibrium demands.
26 If = +1=2, the argument remains the same. It requires only one more step of eduction and CK of the selection rule of the smallest price. When tends to 0, the limit proportion below which the selection rule is required converges to its value 1=2 in the non noisy case.
property obtains when the proportion of informed agents is less than a certain threshold (equal to 2=3).
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Thus, the present analysis has shown that stability sometimes obtains when the noise is "small", and it has restored a reasonable, although not complete, connection with existing results in the non noisy case. In particular, it has suggested that a probabilistic view of the convergence of the mental process is more appropriate than a purely deterministic one. Although the most signi…cant consequences of this remark are to be found in the small noise case, further re ‡ection along this line in the general case may be deserved; it is out of the scope of this paper.
Connection with evolutive learning
We now turn attention to the link between the eductive learning under consideration here and another kind of learning appearing in the literature, namely Bayesian learning. This is referred to as some kind of evolutive learning because, contrarily to eductive learning, it takes place in real time and then involves (Bayesian) updating of beliefs through successive observations of some public statistics aggregating private information. We shall argue here that the lessons drawn from the "eductive"analysis stress dramatically di¤erent aspects of a learning process than the ones emphasized by Bayesian learning. Furthermore, these di¤erences between the two approaches receive an intuitive and convincing interpretation.
Bayesian learning, as de…ned in Vives (1993) for instance, is described as the long run outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a repeated game. Stage game is a play of the economy. We consider here an adaptation of such learning procedures to our model. It proceeds as follows:
At the initial time, the true state G or B is revealed to informed agents. The non informed agents'common prior consists in probability 1=2 to each state.
At every date t, every informed agent plays his dominant strategy: B p (resp. G p) when B (resp. G) is observed. Every non informed agent submits to the auctioneer a linear demand schedule of the form E( jp t 1 ) p, where E( jp t 1 ) depends on the sequence p t 1 of past observations through Bayesian updating. 28 Hence, non informed agents do not attempt to extract information 27 This result is proven in the discussion paper in a more general case (a sequence of noise " with a log-concave C 2 symmetric density function). When the densities of the " are not log-concave, examples can be found where an equilibrium exists and, still, coordination at the limit fails with positive probability whatever the proportion of informed agents.
28 p t 1 denotes the vector (p 1 ; :::; p t 1 ) of past prices.
from the current price in the sophisticated way under scrutiny here, but update their beliefs on the expected value of the signal from the examination of past prices. 29 Precisely, non informed agents have a common estimation:
where LG t is the likelihood ratio Pr(Gjp t 1 )= Pr(Bjp t 1 ) at date t. Aggregate demand is always downward sloping so that there is a unique market clearing price p t that is publicly announced by the auctioneer. Hence, in the noisy economy, 30 if " t is drawn at time t, the market clearing condition at time t writes down:
As the ratio LG t is determined by the past observations p t 1 , the probability Pr(p t jG; p t 1 ) of observing a price p t in state G, after a sequence p t 1 has been observed is B + + (1
Besides, by Bayes'law, one obtains:
LG t+1 = Pr(Gjp t 1 ) Pr(Bjp t 1 ) = Pr(p t jG; p t 1 ) Pr(Gjp t 1 ) Pr(p t jB; p t 1 ) Pr(Bjp t 1 ) = Pr(p t jG; p t 1 ) Pr(p t jB; p t 1 )
LG t :
Therefore, revision of their prior by non informed agents follows the law of motion:
where
, as de…ned in Section 3. This is a very standard result that, in the long run, successful learning obtains, i.e. LG t converges with probability 1 to 0 and +1 in states B and G respectively. It follows that, with successful (je trouve très ambigu de parler de Bayesian learning,pour evolutive, les deux processus reposent fondamentalement sur l'hypothése bayésienne)..Bayesian learning, the sequence of prices converges in the long run to the fully revealing prices of the stage game, whereas eductive coordination leads to the discovery of the partially revealing equilibrium. More importantly, the relevant parameter for considering Bayesian learning e¢ ciency appears to be not long run convergence itself, but rather the speed of convergence.
Notice that a speed of eductive convergence can be de…ned in a natural way. Coming back to the eductive argument described in Section 4 in the (MLRC) case, recall that, for every price p 0 , at the …rst step of the argument, it is CK that total excess demand (at p 0 and in state B) is smaller than z 0 . Thus, for every N , consider that, after N steps of eduction, it is CK that total excess demand is either smaller or larger 31 than the value z N that is iteratively de…ned by z N = p (z N 1 ). A "natural" speed of eductive convergence is then de…ned as the speed of convergence of the Cobweb sequence z N starting with z 0 , z 1 and z 2 and converging towards the equilibrium point (as visualized on Figure 4) . A formal de…nition is given by considering a linear approximation of the behavior of the sequence z N near the equilibrium point Z (p; B). Such an approximation is: Thus, although the Bayesian and eductive viewpoints are not directly comparable, it may be worthwhile to directly confront the conditions of eductive stability to the speed of convergence of Bayesian learning. To this purpose, we focus on the Gaussian case in the next Proposition.
Proposition 5.2. Whatever the distribution of the noise, the sequence LG t converges to 0 (resp. +1) in state B (resp. G) with probability 1 and the speed of the convergence is exponential, at the rate E ln '. If the distribution of the noise is normal, with mean 0 and variance 2 , then this rate is equal to ( ) 2 = 2 .
Proof. The …rst part of the proposition is standard (see O'Hara (1995) for instance). The value of the rate of convergence in the Gaussian case is computed as follows, with (z) = exp (z 2 = 2 ) = p 2 2 :
This proposition has to be compared with Proposition 4.2 concluding at eductive stability with a Gaussian noise. The di¤erence between the two approaches is striking and can be easily interpreted in terms of the two sensitivity and ampli…cation e¤ects.
On the one hand, the speed of convergence of Bayesian learning is determined by two factors: the larger the (commonly known) di¤erence between prices in both states at a given " and the smaller the variance are, the greater is the convergence speed. These two factors are reminiscent from the sensitivity e¤ect: this e¤ect is bounded by =4 2 in the Gaussian case under consideration. It is remarkable that the directions of changes of the two quoted factors that improve the convergence speed of evolutive learning are unfavorable to the success of "eductive" learning. This striking di¤erence has an easy intuitive explanation. Bayesian learning is made easier by the informativeness of the public signal at equilibrium, whereas eductive stability is made more di¢ cult when this signal is too informative. In this case, the extraction of information from prices requires namely a more precise and then more di¢ cult guess of others'behavior.
On the other hand, the ampli…cation e¤ect that is bounded by (1 ) in the Gaussian case has no counterpart in Bayesian learning. An intuitive explanation is as follows: this e¤ect corresponds to the impact on aggregate excess demand of mistakes by non informed agents when guessing others'behavior. With Bayesian learning, no agent can make such an unpredictable mistake that would prevent others from correctly extracting information from prices.
Extensions
There are many possible lines of extension of our analysis: they are essentially out of the scope of this paper. What we attempt to do in this section is more modest: leaving the speci…c framework that we have considered until now, we focus attention on the essential ingredients of our argument and then assess its proper scope. Doing so, we broaden as much as possible the …eld of validity of the previous statements, while essentially sticking to the previous argument.
Indeed, it seems that the two key facts of our analysis are the following:
There are so-called informed agents who receive, a binary (here but the signal might take any …nite number of values) 32 signal and who have a downward sloping excess demand. Signals can unambiguously be called Good or Bad.
The so-called uninformed agents have a demand that depends on the price and the expected value of the signal, as they can assess it. Demand decreases with price and increases with the expected value of the signal.
We can consider the just evoked demand functions as providing a reduced form of our problem.
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De…nition 6.1. The "economy"consists of informed and uninformed agents.
-The informed agents have a dominant strategy excess demand Z I (p; :), that is C 1 , decreasing in p and satis…es that Z I (p; B) < Z I (p; G) for every p. -The demand Z N I (p; P ) of every non informed agent is C 1 , decreasing in p and increasing in P , where P is the probability of state G as evaluated by the non informed agent.
The de…nition speaks for itself. State G is unambiguously the good state as the informed demand increases from B to G and the non informed demand increases with P .
The de…nition of an equilibrium given in Section 2 directly extends to the present case. A partially revealing equilibrium consists of three elements. First, the equilibrium strategy transmitted by an informed agent is Z I (p; s), if he observes signal s (either G or B), and the one transmitted by a non-informed agent is Z N I (p) = Z N I (p; P (p)), where the probability P (p) depends on the price p. Second, market clears: for every ", and every signal s, there is a price equilibrium p("; s) de…ned as the smallest zero of:
and all demanded transactions at this price are implemented. Third, non informed agents extract information from the price in a Bayesian way: P (p) is 32 With a …nite number of signals, the problem is still one dimensional: at a price p, the demand of every non informed agent is determined by his/her expectations of non informed agents'aggregate demand. 33 The …nancial model o¤ered in Appendix …ts this de…nition.
Z(p; B);
I (p) at every price p appearing with positive probability (with I (p) = Z I (p; G) Z I (p; B)), and P (p) may take any value between 0 and 1 at any other price.
For the sake of concision, we give extensions of the three main results only. The basic intuitions (as well as the proofs of the results) are similar to the ones developed in Sections 3 and 4. 34 We …rst give a (straightforward) generalization of the existence part of Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 6.2. Assume that the distribution of the noisy supply is logconcave. Then, there exists (at least) an equilibrium.
The equilibrium excess demand may be not decreasing and there may be multiple equilibria. Log-concavity of the density of the noise is now far from being su¢ -cient for uniqueness of equilibrium and decreasing equilibrium demand. A further analysis shows that those properties require additional non minor assumptions, a complete study of which is out of the scope of this paper. 35 We assume from now on that equilibrium is unique and aggregate excess demand at equilibrium is decreasing and we turn attention to eductive stability. The de…nition of eductive stability is similar to the one used in Section 4. Namely, we introduce a "naive updating conjecture" aggregate demand that is denoted b Z:
with z the commonly expected value of aggregate demand at price p in state B.
At price p and in state s, when all the non informed agents expect a demand z and then a probability z; I (p) of the good state G, the actual aggregate demand is b Z(p; s; z). One easily convinces oneself that eductive stability obtains when, at every price p, the map b Z(p; B; :) (or equivalently the map b Z(p; G; :)) is globally contracting ( b Z is the analogous of the map p introduced in Section 4). Due to the non linearity of the model under consideration in this section, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of Section 4 will be transposed in either su¢ cient conditions or necessary ones only.
To state stability results in the present model, two (weak) assumptions will be needed:
Assumption A1. There exist two constants A third Assumption will be required in the next result only: it says that the derivative of Z N I with respect to P is bounded from above:
Assumption A3. There exists a real constant 1 such that
The smallest value of , as de…ned here, is one. It indeed obtained (together with I (p) = N I (p) = ) in the case of the previous sections, where demand was linear with respect to the probability. In general, the value of re ‡ects the values of higher order derivatives of Z N I .
The …rst proposition below extends the su¢ ciency part of Proposition 4.2 (that can be viewed as a special case for
M ax = and = 1 of the proposition below). Proposition 6.3. Assume in addition to A1, A2 and A3 that " follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2 and that equilibrium is unique with a decreasing aggregate excess demand. A su¢ cient condition for "eductive"stability is:
Again, this formula allows us to identify both the sensitivity (of expected demand on beliefs) and the ampli…cation (of beliefs on demand) e¤ects. The latter is bounded by (1 ) Lastly, the generalization of Proposition 4.3 requires to consider a concept of aggregate excess demand that rules out any active guessing behavior on the part of the non informed. This concept is represented by the "naive updating conjecture" aggregate demand b Z: the partial derivative @ p b Z re ‡ects the e¤ect of the price on the aggregate demand, when the non informed agents have a conjecture z on excess demand in state B that does not depend on p, although they take care of the variations of I (p). We have then the following proposition:
Proposition 6.4. Assume A1, A2 and that is log-concave. Assume existence of a unique equilibrium with decreasing aggregate excess demand Z (p; s).
1. If the equilibrium is stable, Z(p; B) satis…es for (almost) every price p:
is constant in p and:
a necessary condition for eductive stability of an equilibrium is that the demand of non informed agents is a decreasing function of the price.
The statement has the same ‡avor as Proposition 4.3 (in the case of previous sections, F max = 1 and the condition in Point 2 reduces to < 1=2). However, there is a family of functions b Z, and not a single one, as in the previous case, and the interpretation of the slope condition is somewhat more intricate. Still, it is the case that a too aggressive use of the information contained in the prices, making the "strategic" excess demand more than twice ‡atter than the "non strategic" one, destroys the basis for eductive coordination.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed an alternative approach for evaluating the market performance in transmitting information through prices. For developing the analysis, it has focused attention on a stylized competitive model that sticks to the original options of the literature on information revealing prices.
We believe that the conclusions obtained considerably clarify the operative forces for the convergence of "eductive" learning processes. In particular, the same two sensitivity and ampli…cation e¤ects allow for interpreting di¤erent results. The analytical evaluation of the role of di¤erent factors with for example the ambiguous role of noise and of the number of informed agents for coordination, sheds new light on the conditions of successful transmission of information through prices. The slope conditions of Proposition 4.3 and its just stated generalization illustrate the perturbing role of too rapidly changing beliefs and provide a synthetical and fairly intuitive view of the conditions of success of eductive coordination. All these …ndings are likely to sustain the understanding of more complex situations.
However, our analysis does not exhausts the subject, even in the class of simple models a la Grossman-Stiglitz considered here. An important robustness issue concerns the case where information is not sharp, as here. On this point, a paper by Desgranges (1999) sheds a most useful complementary light on our analysis. In a model where no agent observes all the relevant available information but every agent observes a di¤erent piece of private information, Desgranges (1999) obtains stability results sustaining the intuitions developed in the present analysis about the informativeness of equilibrium prices and the ambiguous role played by the proportion of informed agents (an equivalent of which in that setting is the precision of private information). Also, in a non noisy model, robust coordination failures may obtain as suggested by an example exhibited by . Furthermore, the case where information is not sharp has to be treated with the understanding of the e¤ects of noisy transmission on the strength of CK arguments that have been illuminated in the work of Morris-Shin (1998) .
Finally, the consequences of the present views for the more recent analysis of information transmission in oligopolistic contexts, remain to be ascertained in future research. We present here two models that …t the extended setting introduced in Section 6. i) Demand, instead of being inventory demand, might be demand for an input in production. Suppose for example that, in order to produce z units of wheat to-morrow sold at price , the farmers have to use z 2 =2 units of an input that is sold at p today. They maximize E( )z pz 2 =2.
ii) Demand concerns a risky asset whose price to-morrow has a distribution with known and given variance, let us say d 2 , and a mean which can be partially discovered. The signal s = B; G gives the following incomplete information: the future value follows a normal distribution with mean s and variance d 2 independent of s. Consider that every agent has a CARA utility function with an absolute risk aversion coe¢ cient b. It is a well-known result that the quantity demanded by an informed agent when the price is p is: Z I (p; s) = (s p) =bd 2 . Note that the demand of the non informed is not generally a linear function of p, since the information transmitted by p changes the variance faced by the non informed.
The setting is then similar to Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) 's one. The stylized phenomenon under scrutiny is however simpler. First, the information signal is here binary rather than continuous: G and B can be interpreted as respectively a "bullish" and a "bearish" signal. 36 Second, in line with the sketched interpretation, all informed agents receive the same signal.
There is also some relationship between the model of this paper and the one introduced by Gennotte-Leland (1990) in order to discuss the 1987 Wall Street market crash: however, there are not, here, risk neutral market-makers and the uninformed agents are rational actors rather than …xed automata.
We have then the following result that is analogous to Proposition 6.3:
Proposition 8.1. In the "…nance"model, there exists a unique equilibrium, aggregate demand is decreasing and a su¢ cient condition for eductive stability is:
The lesson of this case has the same ‡avor as the general case: the factors favoring inertia of agent's demand to information are always good for stability (large risk aversion b, bad precision 1=d 2 of signal ) 37 . In particular, an increase in the proportion of informed agents has an ambiguous e¤ect in the eductive approach, whereas it always increases the precision of information revealed by the equilibrium price. Consider now the second level of the CK assumptions (everyone knows that everyone is rational): the above intervals I B and I G are known to everyone. 37 The in ‡uence of these factors is the same when market e¢ ciency is analysed through the amount of information revealed by equilibrium price (see Hellwig 1980 for instance).
If > = + 1=2, then the above intervals do not intersect and p in I B (resp. I G ) reveals B (resp. G) with probability 1. Every non informed agent plays B p or G p on each of these intervals. Then, one checks that any non informed agent's strategy satisfying this constraint, together with the dominant strategy of informed agents, de…nes a fully revealing equilibrium with prices p(B; ") = B " and p(G; ") = G ". If = + 1=2, then the above intervals do intersect. However p in I B I G (resp. I G I B ) reveals B (resp. G) with probability 1 and every non informed agent plays B p or G p on each of these intervals. Aggregate demand Z(p; B) is B p on I B I G and < =2 implies, for " 2 [ ; ], p(B; ") = B " is a market clearing price. As this is necessarily the smallest one, it is chosen by the auctioneer. Hence one more step of the CK assumptions (making use of knowledge of the selection rule) lead agents to coordinate on G for every price larger than G (1 ) . Finally, one checks that these beliefs de…nes an equilibrium and p(G; ") = G " obtains. 
